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Berrie Martinis**
I. INTRODUCTION
Since his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist has guided significant changes m Indian law
He has articulated new tests for determining the status of tribes and their
powers as sovereign nations. He has voted to disestablish tribes and limit
their sovereign powers. He has voted to allow states to exercise jurisdic-
tion over Indian and non-Indian activities and property on reservations.
The articulation of a legal philosophy is generally accepted, expected,
and probably necessary for a Supreme Court Justice. At the same time it is
instructive to know the views of the members of the Court, so counsel can
better frame their arguments.
Tlus article discusses Chief Justice Rehnquist's impact on American
Indian jurisprudence. Rehnquist's legal philosophy has proven detrimental
to American Indian rights. As Chief Justice, he has taken a general posi-
tion against the sovereignty of Indian peoples, and has upheld Indian self-
government only to the extent that non-Indians are not affected.
II. CHIEF JusTIcE REHNQUIST'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Chief Justice Rehnquist's first years on the Court were guided by
three basic jurisprudential propositions: (1) conflicts between the mdividu-
al and the government should be resolved against the individual, (2) con-
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flicts between state and federal authority should be resolved m favor of
the states, and (3) questions regarding the exercise of federal courts' pow-
er should be resolved against such exercise.' Since the federal government
is the protector of Indian sovereignty and legal rights, and state interests
frequently conflict with Indian interests, it is not surprising that
Rehnquist's philosophy has proven unfavorable to Indian interests.
Early in Justice Rehnquist's career on the Court, Professor Owen Fiss
of the Yale Law School and Charles Krauthammer, senior editor of The
New Republic, published an analysis of Rehnquist's views.' They argued
that Rehnquist was a judicial activist who did not hesitate to make 90- or
even 180-degree changes in the law through judicial decisions. According
to them, he repudiated precedent and showed no deference to the legisla-
tive branch. Rehnquist, they said, "wants to free the states from the restric-
tions of the national Constitution, particularly those emanating from the
Civil War amendments and the Bill of Rights. His ideal is state auton-
omy "' Rehnquist takes the position that the states should be the linchpins
of the republic. It follows that he sees Indian tribes, with their sovereignty
and separateness from state governments, as violating his preference for
state government. If this preference were merely part of his larger prefer-
ence for decentralized government, this philosophy would naturally carry
along with it a preference for tribal sovereignty His opinions, however,
reflect a view giving the states more power and the tribes less.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Before examining Justice Rehnquist's decisions on federal Indian law,
a short history of national legislative and judicial policies toward Indians
and Indian tribes will provide some perspective. The development of fed-
eral Indian law has been marked by federal policy swings with devastating
impacts on tribes. Rehnquist's judicial policies may prove to be a similar
kind of swing, with similar impacts.
A. The Policy Swings
The first major step in federal policy regarding the Indians was the
removal of many Eastern tribes to lands west of the Mississippi River to
make room for non-Indian settlement. Indians resisting removal were told
that if they remained in the East they could not expect the federal govern-
1. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293, 294
(1976).
2. Owen Fiss & Charles Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court: A Return to the Antebeliwn
Constitution, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 15-16.
3. Id. at 15-18.
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ment to protect them. 4 They were told they would have to submit to state
jurisdiction and state law because the Constitution made no provision for
separate sovereigns to exist within a state5 To encourage voluntary re-
moval, the Indians were told that west of the Mississippi they would be
forever free from state and federal interference.6
The discovery of gold and lugh-quality farmland in the western Unit-
ed States m the md-19th century brought hordes of miners and settlers to
Indian-occupied lands.7 This time the government's solution was to create
reservations for the Indians, again to separate them from the white invad-
ers, often finding it necessary to coerce, cajole, or force the tribes onto
reservations! The fact that these reservation lands were typically barren
and unproductive did not matter because, the government rationalized, the
Indians would occupy them only temporarily pending their assimilation
into the larger Society.9
Assimilation became the official national policy in the 1880s when
Congress enacted the General Allotment Act,0 designed to give mdividu-
al Indians or families a parcel of reservation land for their exclusive use,
to break up the Indians' communal lifestyle and religious beliefs, and to
encourage the Indians to take up farming, like the majority culture." Un-
4. President Jefferson made this clear in a letter to the governor of Indiana Territory:
Should any tribe b  foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing [of]
the whole country of that tribe, and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only con-
dition of peace, would be an example to others, and a furtherance of our final consolida-
tion
Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, Governor of Indian Territory (Feb.
27, 1803), in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN PoLICY (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1975) [herein-
after DOCUMENTS].
5. See, e.g., Letter from Secretary of War John H. Eaton to the Cherokee delegation (April 18,
1829), in DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 44-47 (stating that the Indians must leave Georgia and move
across the Mississippi River or face "ruinous" consequences). Eaton stated: "The arms of this country
can never be employed, to stay any state of this Union from the exercise of those legitimate powers
which attach, and belong to their sovereign character." Id. at 46. See also President Andrew Jackson,
First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829), in DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 47-48.
6. Secretary of War Eaton wrote to the Cherokee delegation:
Beyond the Mississippi your prospects will be different. There you will find no conflicting
interests. The United States power and sovereignty, uncontrolled by the high authority of
state jurisdiction, and resting on its own energies, will be able to say to you, in the lan-
guage of your own nation, the soil shall be yours while the trees grow, or the streams rn.
Letter from Secretary of War Eaton, supra note 5, at 46.
7. See ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE INDIAN FRONTIER OF THm AMERIcAN WEST, 1846-1890, 37-40
(1984).
8. See FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 121-25
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
9. Id. at 129, 139.
10. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. For a discussion of the purposes and effects of the allotment policy, see John W. Ragsdale,
Indian Reservations and the Preservation of Tribal Culture: Beyond Wardship to Stewardship, 59
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der the Allotment Act, the tribes ultimately lost two-thirds of their land.'"
Congress finally ended the allotment process in 1934 by enacting the
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).3
The IRA swung national policy away from assimilation and toward
self-determination. The IRA encouraged Indian tribes to adopt tribal con-
StitUtionS. 14 It also encouraged tribes to create federally chartered tribal
corporations to facilitate business activities both on and off the reserva-
tions.1
5
National policy again swung in the opposite direction in 1953, when
Congress unanimously endorsed the concept of termination-that is, dises-
tablishment of Indian tribes as political, legal, and self-governing enti-
ties.16 One hundred nine tribes were terminated under this policy,'7
though several have been reconstituted. In addition, Congress enacted
Public Law 280, which gave most states authority to declare jurisdiction
over reservations, with or without tribal consent. 9
By the early 1960s the federal government realized that termination,
like the 1887 assimilation policy, was detrimental to Indian welfare."1
Congress changed federal Indian policy again, this time to embrace tribal
UMKC L. REv. 503, 510-513 (1991); see also COHEN, supra note 8, at 130-34.
12. "Indian land holdings were cut from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to 48,000,000 acres m
1934. Through the allotment system, more than 80% of the land value belonging to all the Indians
in 1887 has been taken away from them " Memorandum, Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the
House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18 (1934) (statement of John Collier), in
DAVID H. GErcHEs Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 196 (3d ed. 1993).
13. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C_
§§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter IRA].
14. See 25 U.S.C. § 476.
15. See 25 U.S.C. § 477.
16. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) ("It is the policy of
Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians withn the temtorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to
American citizenship "). See also COHEN, supra note 8, at 174-75.
17. Charles F Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.
INDiAN L. REv. 139, 151 (1977).
18. The Menominee and Klamath tribes were the largest tribes terminated in the 1950s. Id.
Both have since been reconstituted. Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988);
Klamath Indian Tribe Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 566 (1988).
19. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
20. In 1970, Richard Nixon put the termination policy to rest:
Because termination is morally and legally unacceptable, because it produces bad practical
results, and because the mere threat of termination tends to discourage greater self-suffi-
ciency among Indian groups, I am asking the Congress to expressly renounce, repudiate
and repeal the termination policy as expressed in House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the
83rd Congress.
President's Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 PuB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970).
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self-determination and self-sufficiency 21 Indian tribes are now encour-
aged to govern themselves,' to enhance tribal economic development,'
and to provide for tribal education.24 Indian tribes strongly endorse the
national policy of self-determination.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has established several principles of Indian law in
conjunction with the development of Indian policy over the years. These
include the trust relationship, sovereignty, certain canons of construction,
and preemption of state law
Two decisions by Cief Justice John Marshall were critical in estab-
lishing the fundamental relationship among the United States, the states,
and Indian tribes. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall held that In-
dian tribes were not foreign nations under Article I of the Constitution,
which authorizes foreign nations to sue in the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.' Marshall ruled that Indian tribes are domestic depen-
dent nations; their relationship to the federal government is that of ward to
guardian.' Thus, the Cherokee nation could not sue directly in the Su-
preme Court or deal directly with foreign nations, as these actions would
be inconsistent with their dependent status.29 A year later, Marshall wrote
the opinion in Worcester v. Georgia," holding that states have no power
on Indian reservations. Only Congress, the Court held, has such power.3
Marshall's rulings in these two cases have long been accepted as funda-
mental doctrine in the field, and the Court has endorsed them innumerable
times from 1832 through the 1970s.32
In addition to further expressing the guardian-ward relationship,
21. The statement of congressional intent is found at 25 U.S.C. § 450-450(a) (1988).
22. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§
450f-450n (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311,
1312, 1321-1326, 1331, 1341 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1903, 1911-1923, 1931-1934, 1951, 1952, 1961-1963 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Act of April 11, 1970, 25 U.S.C. §§ 488-492 (1988); Indian Financing Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at scattered sections following 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988)); Self-
Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f-450n.
24. See, e.g., Indian Education Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 401-453, 86 Stat. 235, 334-45
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 241aa-ff, 1211a, 1221f-n, 3385-3385b (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
25. See AMERICAN I N Poucy REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (1977). The commission
was established by 25 U.S.C. § 174 (1988).
26. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 17-20.
30. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
31. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
32. See generally CoHEN, supra note 8, ch. 5.
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Worcester served as the Court's first recognition of tribal sovereignty
Marshall held that the guardian-ward relationship between the United
States and tribes did not extinguish tribal sovereignty " The Cherokee
nation, he wrote, is a distinct community with its own sovereignty, al-
though the United States, through Congress, can change or diminish that
sovereignty " Until Congress expresses such an intent, however, tribal
sovereignty is complete.35 In Talton v. Mayes,36 the Court affirmed that
tribal sovereignty is not derived from the United States, by holding that
the Bill of Rights does not constram tribal governments.37 These govern-
ments were not arms of the federal government, but instead operated on
the basis of their own sovereignty 3 A similar result was reached in Unit-
ed States v Wheeler,39 where the Court held that a defendant could be
tried in both tribal and federal court. Double jeopardy did not apply be-
cause two different sovereigns were involved.'
C. Canons of Construction: A Policy Framework
The rules of construction and preemption logically follow from the
definition of the relationship between the federal government and the
tribes, which is grounded in trust and sovereignty ", Rules, or canons, of
construction exist in many fields of law, and are not always particularly
effective. In the field of Indian law, however, canons of construction have
made a real difference. A cluster of important canons has developed in the
area of treaty interpretation. First, treaties are to be construed in favor of
Indians.42 Second, ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in
favor of Indians," or as Indians understood them." Finally, Congress
must show a "clear and plain" intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights.'
The Court has applied similar rules of construction in Indian cases
not involving treaties by holding that statutes and agreements with tribes
are also to be construed in favor of Indians. These rules, too, are based on
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61.
34. Id. at 561.
35. Id.
36. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
37. Mayes, 163 U.S. at 384-85.
38. Id.
39. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
40. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329-30. See also COHEN, supra note 8, at 229-35.
41. COHEN, supra note 8, at 221.
42. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
43. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
44. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970).
45. See Charles F Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abroga.
tion: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is That? 63
CAL. L. REv. 601 (1975). See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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the trust relationsup.' A careful examination of the cases in this area
indicates that until recently these canons of construction were potent.47
The doctrine of federal preemption also has special application in
federal Indian law McClanahan v Arizona Tax Commission provides
an articulate description of the preemption doctrine as it applies to Indian
law Sovereignty provides the backdrop for interpreting applicable treaties
and statutes to determine whether state jurisdiction is preempted on a
reservation.49 Courts must balance the interests of states as political en-
tities against the proper assertion of federal interests, but the canon of
construing ambiguities in favor of the Indians, combined with the fact that
the tribes are themselves sovereign political entities, tips the balance in
favor of preemption."0 Since McClanahan, the Court has placed great
reliance on the doctrine of preemption in deciding Indian cases. Indian
litigants ordinarily want the Court to find preemption, because this will
prevent state law from applying on the reservation and allow a tribe great-
er freedom to determine its own laws and policies. States, on the other
hand, are generally interested in extending their jurisdiction as far as pos-
sible, and normally oppose preemption.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has chosen to ignore many of these legal
precedents. He has also failed to learn from the past policy vacillations of
Congress. Congress has learned, primarily through trial and error, that the
right of Indian tribes to self-determination must be protected. Rehnquist
has yet to acknowledge this congressional discovery
IV REHNQUIST'S NEW JUDICIAL TERMINATION POLICY
Although Congress has rejected the policy of termination, Rehnquist
and the Court seem to have adopted it. Chief Justice Rehnquist has made
it Ins policy to clup away at the sovereignty of Indian nations. His policy
contradicts not only the will of Congress, but also a long line of Supreme
Court decisions affirming inherent tribal sovereignty
Chief Justice Rehnquist's views suggest that he would substantially
modify rules which date from the John Marshall Supreme Court. The
Indian cases handled by Rehnquist can be divided into the areas of dises-
tablishment, the trust relationship, jurisdiction, religious freedom, rules of
construction, preemption and standing, and state tax immunities. An exam-
mation of the Cief Justice's opinions in each of these areas illustrates the
46. Hualapi Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
47. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 221-25 (describing canons fundamental to federal Indian law
and essential to the trust relationship).
48. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
49. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171.
50. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 272-75.
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devastating impact his legal philosophy has had, and continues to have, on
Indians.
A. Disestablishment Cases
The law is clear: Congress has the power to disestablish Indian reser-
vations and to destroy tribal sovereignty 5 To do this, however, Congress
must state its intent clearly and unambiguously 52 Thus, a canon of statu-
tory construction protects tribal existence and sovereignty An examination
of recent opinions, however, shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist's judicial
agenda ignores this canon; Rehnquist manages to find congressional intent
to disestablish even where it would seem impossible to do so.
In the 1977 case of Rosebud Sioux Tribe v Kneip,53 for example, the
tribe sought a declaratory judgment that certain acts of Congress had not
diminished the extent of their reservation.54 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, analyzed the acts and found clear congressional intent to
disestablish.5 In dissent, Justice Marshall agreed that the intent of the
laws was absolutely clear-but in the opposite direction! 6 Marshall
pointed out that precedent required the Court to hold against disestablish-
ment if any doubt existed. 7 He thought it unnecessary to resort to this
rule, however, because the unambiguous intent of Congress was merely to
open parts of the reservation to non-Indian settlement.5
Kneip suggests that Rehnquist, a supposed judicial conservative, has
little use for the canon protecting tribes against disestablishment. The very
fact that members of the Court reached such opposite conclusions is strong
evidence that Congress's intent was less than clear. Thus, the lack of
disestablishment was all but proved by the very Court that ruled it had
occurred. Congress never disestablished the Rosebud reservation. An activ-
ist Court, led by Justice Rehnquist, did.
In subsequent opinions, Rehnquist articulated a principle that fur-
thered his disestablishment agenda. This principle can be described as the
diminishment of history, or a sense that time rights all wrongs. In United
States v Sioux Nation,59 Rehnquist dissented from the Court's holding
that the federal seizure of the Black Hills was a taking for which just
51. See id. at 221-25.
52. Metz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1972); see also COHEN, supra note 8, at 221-25.
53. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
54. Kneip, 430 U.S. at 585.
55. Id. at 605.
56. Id. at 620-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 617.
58. Id. at 620-21; see also COHEN, supra note 8, at 221-25.
59. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
[Vol. 16
REHNQUIST & INDIAN CASES
compensation was due.' Rehnquist argued that any past injustices to the
tribes and the methods of acquiring their lands were irrelevant to the pres-
ent legal decision.61 By whatever means, Congress had dimmnshed the
reservation, and need not pay compensation.' Similarly, in County of
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,63 Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens's
dissent arguing that the tribes had forfeited their claim by waiting too long
to assert it.64
Although disestablishment is supposed to be difficult to bring
about-requiring a clear statement of congressional intent-Rehnquist
would make it easier by arguing that time erases the need to remedy
wrongful disestablishments. To aid in this analysis, Rehnquist has found it
necessary to ignore the trust relationship, a basic principle of Indian law
B. The Trust Relationship
The trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes has
been the backbone of federal Indian law for more than a century But
times are changing. Rehnquist has rejected the trust responsibility of the
United States toward Indian tribes in favor of a new trust responsibility of
the United States toward the states.
Rehnquist has been quite successful in finding legal presumptions to
serve as counterweights to the canons favoring Indians. In United States v
Mitchell,65 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority that al-
though the General Allotment Act 6 did not require the federal govern-
ment to manage allotment timber holdings as a trustee,67 the more recent
Indian timber management statutes did, and the government was subject to
liability for breach of its trust duties.' Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice
Powell's dissent, which pointed to the presumption that Congress never
creates liability on the part of the United States without a clear expression
of intent.69 Powell argued, in effect, that the government has conflicting
duties--one toward Indians, and one toward non-Indian society-and this
60. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424 (Rehnqist, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 435.
62. Id. In concluding his argument against compensating the Sioux Nation for the taken lands,
Rehnquist quoted the Bible: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." Id. at 437. What does Rehnquist con-
sider to be the province of the Court? Are the Justices not supposed to be judges, with the duty of
correcting past injustices and preventing new ones, rather than merely custodians of the status quo?
63. 470 U.S. 226, 255-56 (1985).
64. Oneida, 470 U.S. at 255-56.
65. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
66. Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered sections
following 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
67. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216.
68. Id. at 225-26.
69. Id. at 228-33.
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conflict should be resolved according to "existing principles," that is, ac-
cording to the requirement that there be no federal liability without ex-
press congressional intent.7"
If Rehnquist seemed to have concerns about conflicting duties in
Mitchell, they had apparently not vexed him when he wrote the majority
opinion released three days earlier, Nevada v United States.7' In Nevada,
the Court held that the federal government did not violate the trust duty by
representing both Indians and non-Indians (an irrigation district) m a 1944
water adjudication:
[Ilt may well appear that Congress was requiring the Secretary of the
Interior to carry water on at least two shoulders when it delegated to him
both the responsibility for the supervision of the Indian tribes and the
commencement of reclamation projects in areas adjacent to reservation
lands. But Congress chose to do this, and it is simply unrealistic to sug-
gest that the Government may not perform its obligation to represent
Indian tribes in litigation when Congress has obliged it to represent other
interests as well. [T]he Government cannot follow the fastidious
standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his sin-
gle beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests
without the beneficiary's consent. The Government does not "compro-
mise" its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to represent
by the mere fact that it simultaneously performs another task for another
interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do.7
The Court held that the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe was bound by an earli-
er adjudication of its water rights, despite the tribe's argument that it had
not received notice of the adjudication.73
To fully appreciate the implications of the trust duty in the Nevada
case, one must keep in mmd that tribes today are much more competent at
looking out for their own interests than they were in 1944. Most tribes
have better access to lawyers, who are in turn more knowledgeable in the
field of federal Indian law In the 1940s, tribes had virtually no access to
attorneys, except through the Department of the Interior and the United
States Attorney General's office. Before 1944, tribes were ordinarily repre-
sented by the Solicitor General's office, whose representation was often
compromised by its conflicting duty to defend the interests of federal
agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Agricul-
70. Id. at 232.
71. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
72. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128.
73. Id. at 143, 144 n.16.
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ture.74 Since 1966, tribes have been able to sue in their own names
through private attorneys," and have often done so -when the Solicitor
General and Attorney General have declined to bring suit on their be-
half.76 Although the trust policy might be less important today, in 1944 it
was essential.
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist treats the events of 1944 as if they
occurred today He seems unaware of the special reasons that a trust rela-
tionship exists with Indian tribes and not with other racial minorities, and
of the fact that departments of government have not labored under the
financial, cultural, and racial handicaps that have affected Indian tribes. In
short, he ignores the rationale for upholding the trust relationship that was
both necessary and appropriate in 1944.
Under Rehnquist the Court has reduced the potency of-if not reject-
ed outnght-the guardian-ward relationship first articulated by John Mar-
shall more than 160 years ago and reaffirmed many times since." He has
also rejected the second basic principle of federal Indian law established
by the Marshall Court-that of the sovereignty of Indian tribes. He has
done this by rejecting the jurisdiction of tribal courts and upholding the
force of state law on Indian reservations.
C. Jurisdiction
The 1978 case of Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe' raised the
question of whether an Indian tribal court has jurisdiction over a non-
Indian who has violated the tribal code on the reservation. 79 The
Suquanush Tribe charged Oliphant, a non-Indian, with assaulting an offi-
cer and resisting arrest, crimes that apply to "any person" under the tribe's
criminal code."° Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist held that
tribal courts have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even for tribal
code crimes."'
Recall that the rule was by now well established that Indian tribal
74. See GErCHES ET AL., supra note 12, at 369.
75. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1362 (1988)).
76. See Daniel H. Israel, The Re-Emergence of Tribal Nationalism and its Impact on Reserva-
tion Resource Development, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 617, 624-25 (1976).
77. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
78. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. About 30 tribes, out of a total of 180 tribes with tribal courts,
have codes that would permit them to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 196. These
codes cover "any person" who commits an offense against the code, not merely "any Indian." Most of
these codes have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior.
80. Id. at 194.
81. Id. at 212.
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powers of self-government continue except as Congress has removed them
through clear and unequivocal legislation. 2 Oliphant established entirely
different criteria, first used by Rehnquist here, and repeated in subsequent
cases. Rehnquist wrote that there has always been an "unspoken assump-
tion" or "commonly shared presumption" of Congress that tribes do not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." Rehnquist applied a test
that does not attempt to elicit the "intent" of Congress based on enacted
laws or clusters of laws. Rather, it is founded on a supposed assumption
made by Congress, which is not found in any legislation or other docu-
mentation. This means, of course, that the Justices can engage in a mys-
tical game of reading the mind of Congress, using "unspoken assump-
tions" to justify any change in legal doctrine the Court chooses to make.
In the 1800s, when Rehnquist's "unspoken assumption" was suppos-
edly forming, Congress passed many laws dealing with Indians. 4 Con-
gress did not rely on the courts to discern its "unspoken assumption" when
interpreting laws. Congressional silence really means what it is commonly
supposed to mean-absolutely nothing.
In any event, the pre-Oliphant test-whether federal legislation ex-
pressed a clear intent to diminish tribal powers-has been replaced by a
new analysis, in which the Court tries to find (or create) an "unspoken
assumption" of Congress as the basis for diminishing tribal powers of self-
government. To establish the "commonly held presumption" that tribes
have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Rehnquist relied on a
number of flawed arguments.
First, Rehnquist pointed to some early treaties which provided that
any non-Indian who did injury to Indians would be tried by the laws of
the United States.85 He concluded that "the history of Indian treaties is
consistent with the principle that the tribes may not assume criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians without the perlmssion of Congress." 6 In read-
ing these treaties, however, one finds no such consistent principle; most
contain no provision on crimes by non-Indians. 7 The absence of any
mention of criminal jurisdiction says nothing about Congress's intent.
82. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
83. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203, 206.
84. See generally CoHEN, supra note 8, at 62-127.
85. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201-03.
86. Id. at 197.
87. No treaty in the Pacific Northwest addressed this question. See Treaty of Medicine Creek,
Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point Elliot, Jan. 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No
Point, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty With the Makabs (Treaty of Neah Bay), Jan. 31, 1855, 12
Stat. 939; Treaty of the Yakimas, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty of Olympia, Jan. 25, 1856, 12
Sat. 971. Most of these treaties did, however, provide that whites could not live on a reservation
without permission from the tribe. The treaties also generally provided for removal and trial in federal
court of Indians who broke the laws of the United States.
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Second, Rehnquist cited a statement from an 1878 opinion of Judge
Isaac Parker, Federal District Judge for the Western District of Arkan-
sas,88 for the proposition that tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-
Indians.89 But Rehnquist quoted Judge Parker out of context. Looking at
the entire opinion it is clear that Parker treated the matter as one of statu-
tory interpretation, and thought a federal statute had preempted tribal
junsdiction. 9 In contrast, Rehnquist's Oliphant argument expressly re-
jected the theory that any federal statute is controlling, thereby rejecting
any preemption argument and rendering Parker's statement irrelevant.91
Rehnquist's reliance on Judge Parker's opinion is inappropriate.
Interestingly, Rehnquist asserted that Judge Parker's opinion had been
"reaffirmed only recently" in a 1970 opinion of the solicitor of the De-
partment of the Interior.93 Tis statement is simply wrong. The opinion
was withdrawn in 1974,"4 and has not been replaced. Withdrawn opinions
are not useful as precedent.
Third, Rehnquist cited the original 1941 Cohen's Handbook of Feder-
al Indian Law as supporting the lack of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.95 Cohen did indeed state that federal courts had refused to
allow tribes to punish non-Indians; however, Cohen cited no authority
other than Judge Parker's 1878 opinion. As we have already seen, this
opinion is based on a wrong interpretation of a statute and is not authorita-
tive."e
88. Rehnqust's discovery of Judge Isaac Parker's opimon must have been especially gratifying
to the Justice, in view of his longtime hobby of researching and studying Judge Parker. Justice
Rehnquist once said that he had "gathered some fascinating minutiae with a view to eventually writing
a biography" of Judge Parker. John A. Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. Timms, March'3, 1985, at 27.
Judge Parker was the noted hanging judge of Arkansas from 1875 to 1896. During his 21 years on the
bench, Judge Parker meted out 172 death sentences, which were carred out promptly. Richard B.
Collins, Implied Limitations of the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 479, 492 n.78
(1979). Until 1891, defendants had no right of appeal from Parker's sentences. In a speech in 1983,
Rehnquist asserted, "Judge Parker's trials were swift, and there was no appeal, but the fundamentals of
due process were undoubtedly present" Jenkins, supra, at 27.
89. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200 (quoting Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878)
(No. 7,720)).
90. Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas 353, 354-55 (W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
91. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195 n.6; see also Collins, supra note 88, at 492 nn.78-79 (arguing
that Rehnquist's reliance on Judge Parker's statement is rmsleading and logically inconsistent with the
Oliphant reasoning).
92. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 200-01.
93. Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes Over Non-Indians, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970) (with-
drawn in 1974).
94. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 201 n.il.
95. Id. at 199 n.9 (quoting FEIX S. COHEN, FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 41 (1941)).
96. COHEN, supra note 8, at 148.
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Finally, Justice Rehnquist cited the Western Territory Bill of 1834.'
This bill, if passed, would have prohibited Indian courts from punishing
non-Indians. But the bill never passed. 98 Relying on it is inappropriate. If
anything, it indicates that the 1834 Congress assumed that non-Indians
were subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction unless Congress provided other-
wise.
Rehnquist further buttressed his "unspoken assumption" argument by
finding that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians would be inconsis-
tent with tribes' dependent status.99 This test came from Cherokee Nation
v Georgia,1°° a case that dealt with quite different issues. In that case,
the question was whether the tribe was a foreign nation in the international
law sense. Chief Justice John Marshall held that Indian tribes are not
foreign nations, but instead are "domestic dependent" nations. They lost
their international foreign status by reason of conquest, and because such
status would be inconsistent with their dependent status vis-a-vis the Unit-
ed States.'01
Marshall's "dependency" principle was not intended to apply inside
the United States. Within this country the status of Indian tribes is deter-
mined by the Constitution and acts of Congress. In international law, the
use of the dependency criterion makes sense: a domestic dependent nation
could not have its own foreign relations powers without potentially com-
promising the foreign affairs of the nation upon which it is dependent. But
in the criminal jurisdiction context this reasoning makes no sense. Exercis-
ing criminal jurisdiction within reservation borders does not carry the
same potential for compromising the interests of the dominant state, par-
ticularly when Congress can act to protect those interests simply by pass-
ing legislation restricting jurisdiction."° Worse, applying it in this con-
text gives the Court unprincipled discretion to decide the extent of tribal
court jurisdiction.
Finally, Rehnquist argued that non-Indians would not receive the
protections due them under the Constitution if they were subjected to
tribal court jurisdiction.0 3 Under Talton v Mayes,"° decided m 1896,
Indian courts are not constrained by the Bill of Rights of the federal Con-
stitution. In that case, a Cherokee Indian claimed that his conviction for
murdering another Indian violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
97. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
98. Id. at 202 n.13.
99. Id. at 206-08.
100. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
101. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15-17; see also supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
103. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
104. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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ments."'5 The Court held that because the crime was m the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation, the Constitution did not apply- "As
the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation
existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated on by the Fifth
Amendment, which. had for its sole object to control the powers con-
ferred by the constitution on the national government.""' 6 The Court
further found that the interpretation of Cherokee law was solely a matter
for the Cherokee courts."
Congress has been aware since 1896 that tribal courts were not con-
strained by the Bill of Rights.' Congress has also known, since 1886,
that it could apply a legislative bill of rights to tribal governments and
courts; ' 9 however, it did not do so until 1968."0 It is relevant to note
that the issue of the application of the Bill of Rights to Indian tribes did
not arise until 1896, and even then it arose only when an Indian was a
defendant, giving the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction. No case challeng-
ing the application of the Bill of Rights in Indian territory has involved a
non-Indian defendant."' One might also remember that during the 1800s
and the first half of the 20th century Indians, African Americans, and
other persons of color seldom received the benefit of constitutional due
process or equal protection. They certainly did not receive those
protections during the Civil War era when Rehnquist's "commonly held
presumption" supposedly arose. African Americans were slaves before the
Civil War, and were subject to extreme discrimination after it. Indians
were forcibly removed from their homelands, required to move onto reser-
vations, surrender their children to boarding schools, deny their own lan-
guage and religious heritage, and be pushed from place to place at the
federal government's whim. States denied Indians the right to serve on
juries, testify in lawsuits, or attend public schools with whites."' Federal
laws prohibited Indians from riding on railroads, or exercising rights of
free speech or free religion." 3 The Bill of Rights also did not apply to
state action against any person during much of this period.
However, in 1968 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act,"'
105. Mayes, 163 U.S. at 379.
106. Id. at 384.
107. Id. at 385.
108. See generally id.
109. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
110. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
111. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965); Native Amer. Church v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M.
1954).
112. See CoHEN, supra note 8, at 173.
113. Id. at 174.
114. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73, 77-81 (codified as amended mainly at 25
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requiring all tribes to apply a statutory form of the Bill of Rights to all
persons appearing before tribal courts. Habeas corpus is available in feder-
al courts for violations of these rights."' While Justice Rehnquist's civil
nghts argument certainly would have had merit prior to Congress's chang-
Ing attitude and enactment of the Indian Civil Rights bill, it has no rele-
vance now that civil rights constraints bind tribal courts.
The Oliphant opinion, even with its flawed reasoning and unsubstan-
tiated assertions, has had a significant impact on tribal court junsdic-
tion."6 The Rehnquist analytic formula in Oliphant has been used in sev-
eral recent Supreme Court opinions. One of these is Duro v Retna,"7
decided in 1990. Duro, a nonmember Indian"' residing on another
tribe's reservation, was charged under the tribal code with illegally firng a
weapon on the reservation."9 The Court held that tribal courts lacked
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. 2 ' Such jurisdiction, the
Court reasoned, would be mconsistent with the tribe's dependent sta-
tus.
121
A second case is Yakima Nation v Brendale,2 2 in which Rehnquist
joined Justice White's plurality opinion allowing county zoning laws to
apply to the "open" (approximately half fee-owned, open to the general
public)' area of a reservation 124 -even though Congress had never au-
thorized such an intrusion on tribal sovereignty Another plurality refused
to allow county zoning laws to apply to non-Indian owned land on the
"closed" (predominantly tribal ownership) portion of the reservation.
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988).
116. For an in-depth analysis of the flaws in the Oliphant reasoning, see Peter C. Maxfield,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP L.
391 (1993).
117. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
118. A "nonmember Indian" is an Indian from another tribe.
119. Duro, 495 U.S. at 681.
120. Id. at 688.
121. See id. at 686. Interestingly, Congress reversed this decision within three months, returning
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians to tribal courts. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Star. 1892 (1990). In 1991, Congress enacted legislation permanently
giving tribal courts criminal junsdiction over nonmember Indians.
Both Congress's legislation allowing jurisdiction over nonmember Indians and the Court's
denial of junsdiction over non-Indians have only one logical basis: race. The effect of these two legal
developments is to create a racial classification determining the extent of tribal court jurisdiction:
Tribes have jurisdiction over no whites, but over all Indians, even those with no more political or
social connection to the tribe in question than a white would have. See Morton v. Mancan, 417 U.S.
535 (1974). See also Alex Tallchief Skibme, Duro v. Rema and the Legislation That Overturned It: A
Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv 767, 788-89 (1993).
122. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
123. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 416.
124. Id. at 432.
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Rehnquist joined White in dissenting from this second part of the deci-
sion.' These dissenters would allow county zoning to apply to non-
Indian owned land anywhere on the reservation," on the theory that In-
dian sovereignty is only the right to self-government and control over in-
ternal affairs, and is "divested to the extent it is inconsistent with [a]
tribe's dependent status.'" The dissenters based this line of reasoning
on an earlier decision by Justice Stewart, Montana v United States."
In Montana,'29 the Court struck down a resolution of the Crow
Tribe that prohibited nonmembers from hunting and fishing on reservation
land. The majority opinion, which Rehnquist joined, held that the tribe had
no power to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land owned
in fee by non-Indians. 3' Justice Stewart wrote that "exercise of tribal
power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delega-
tion."'' Rehnquist quoted this statement in his dissent to a demal of cer-
tiorari in Namen v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist has succeeded in limiting the tribes' sover-
eign powers.' Rehnquist's idea of sovereignty diminishes sovereignty to
mere self-government. This is not what the John Marshall Court meant by
sovereignty, nor is it the ordinary meaning of the term.
D. Religious Freedom
Chief Justice Rehnquist has exhibited less than serious concern for
protecting the free exercise of religion by Indians. Rehnquist joined Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Employment Division v Smith,'34 holding
that states could deny unemployment benefits to Indians fired for "work
related rmsconduct" based on religious use of peyote. 3 He also joined
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Ass'n,36 holding that a traditional Indian religious site on national
125. See id. at 444.
126. Id. at 432.
127. Id at 425.
128. Id. at 422-25 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
129. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
130. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65.
131. Id. at 564.
132. 459 U.S. 977, 980 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. See Skibine, supra note 121, at 778-81 (discussing "internal" and "external" sovereignty
theories used by the Court).
134. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
135. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
136. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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forest land could not be kept exclusively for Indians, and that the free
exercise clause did not bar the government from timber harvesting and
road construction even if such activity destroyed the Indian religion.'37
Religious exercise by Indians is related to the land much more than
other religions.'38 When sacred lands are destroyed, they cannot be re-
placed by other locations or items. Because the Court's standard free exer-
cise jurisprudence fails to protect sacred lands, it protects the religious
freedom of Indians much less than that of other groups. The Court in
general has failed to recognize this disparity, despite the special trust duty
owed to Indians.
E. Rules of Construction
Whatever the subject, Rehnquist manages to construe the law to limit
or impair the governing powers and jurisdiction of Indian tribes. This is in
direct conflict with a basic canon of Indian law '" This phenomenon is
consistent, however, with Rehnquist's philosophy favoring state powers.
Recall the opinion in Rosebud Tribe v Kneip,' where Rehnquist and
the majority held disestablishment had clearly occurred, while the dissent
found that disestablishment had just as clearly not occurred. 4' It seems
quite incredible that the majority could persist in ruling that Congress
intended to disestablish, and that no ambiguity existed on that issue, when
the dissenters argued just as persistently that Congress did not so intend. It
would seem that the dissenters' opinion itself would establish ambiguity,
and the rule of construction favoring Indian interests, in this case tribal
continuation, would control.
Similarly, in United States v Clarke,42 Justice Rehnquist interpret-
ed as narrowly as possible a federal statute authorizing the condemnation
of Indian lands to hold that inverse condemnation proceedings were not
authorized.43 This meant that Indians could not sue for just compensa-
tion for lands taken, because there had been no condemnation proceeding
before the land was taken.' Rehnquist again interpreted what seems an
ambiguous statute against Indian interests.
In the most famous Indian fishing rights case, Washington v Passen-
137. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-53.
138. See id. at 460-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
140. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
141. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
142. 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
143. Clarke, 445 U.S. at 258-59.
144. Id. at 259.
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ger Fishing Vessel Owners Ass'n 45 the majority held that under the
treaty clause providing Indian tribes the right to fish at their usual and
accustomed off-reservation fishing sites "in common" with citizens of the
territory, the treaty tribes were entitled to fifty percent of the harvestable
salmon and steelhead in treaty waters."4 The dissenters argued it was
wrong to guarantee a particular percentage of fish to the treaty tribes. 47
Justice Rehnquist joined a dissent by Justice Powell arguing that the trea-
ties were unclear, and the majority's interpretation was too favorable to
the Indian tribes."4
Another Rehnquist argument against Indian interests is found in his
dissent in United States v. Sioux Nation.49 The majority held that the
government owed the Sioux Nation just compensation for taking the Black
Hills of South Dakota in 1877.5 Justice Rehnquist argued that final
judgment had been reached in 1943 when a tribal petition for certiorari
was demed; Congress, he said, could not reopen the case because that
would amount to a judicial act-setting aside an earlier final judgment-in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.' Sirm-
larly, in Montana v. United States,' Chief Justice Rehnquist joined a
majority opinion by Justice Stewart holding that a treaty must expressly
refer to the riverbed to reserve it to the tribe against the presumption that
navigable waters are held for future states.'
Some of the opimons Justice Rehnquist has joined may at first glance
appear to favor the Indian side, but an underlying motive in these cases is
usually discernible. For instance, in Ins concurrence in Oneida Nation v
County of Oneida,'54 Justice Rehnquist wrote that the federal government
is responsible for protecting the rights of Indians on lands transferred to
the tribes. 5 According to Rehnquist, however, this amounts to the feder-
al government retaining the right to supervise these lands. 5 This is not
sovereign immunity, but a reassertion that Indian nations exist subject to
the caprice of Congress.
145. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
146. Fishing Vessels Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 685-86.
147. Id. at 703 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 705-06.
149. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
150. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 423-24.
151. Id. at 426-29 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
153. Montana, 450 U.S. at 554.
154. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
155. Oneida, 414 U.S. at 684.
156. Id.
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F Preemption and Standing
Rehnquist tends to deny federal preemption of state laws on Indian
reservations when preemption would be beneficial to Indians. In Ramah
Navajo School Board v New Mexico Bureau of Revenue,"7 for example,
the question was whether the state of New Mexico could tax a contractor
who was building a school for Indians in Indian country The majority
found state law was preempted;" 8 therefore, the tribe was entitled to a
refund of the taxes it had paid on the contractor's behalf.. 9 Rehnquist
dissented, arguing that congressional intent to preempt was not sufficiently
clear."6
When the majority of the Court ruled, in Antoine v Washington,6'
that state game laws could not apply to Indians on land covered by an
agreement between the United States and an Indian tribe,"6' Rehnquist
managed to dissent.'63 The facts would appear, based on precedent, "'
to command the decision of the majority Two Indians appealed a convic-
tion for hunting deer in violation of state statutes. 6 ' In its decision, the
Court noted that the tribe had signed an agreement in 1891 ceding most of
its tentory to the United States, but retaining the right to hunt and fish on
the ceded lands." The Court then pointed to language in subsequent
acts of Congress which, on their face, appear to ratify this agreement.'67
The effect of this ratification, the Court concluded, was to preempt Wash-
mgton state game laws so far as they conflict with the 1891 agree-
ment.6 Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued, in essence, that Congress's
intent was not to actually incorporate the terms of the earlier agreement
because the 1906 act did not contain a word-for-word copy of the
agreement.'69 Thus, he concluded, Congress had not enacted any law that
would preempt Washington's game laws, and the conviction of Colville
Indian Antoine for disobeying these laws should be upheld. 7 '
157. 458 U.S. 832 (1982). See also infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
158. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 846-47.
159. Id. at 835-36.
160. Id. at 854-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Note that here, where congressional silence has
been construed in favor of the Indians, Rehnquist demands that Congress speak. Cf Oliphant, 435
U.S. at 208; see also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
161. 420 U.S. 194, 205 (1975).
162. Antoine, 420 U.S. at 205.
163. Id. at 213.
164. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
165. Antoine, 420 U.S. at 195-97.
166. Id. at 205.
167. Id. (quoting the Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325, 377-78, and the Act of March 1, 1907,
34 Stat. 1015, 1050-51).
168. Id. at 204.
169. Id. at 213-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 215. Here, Congress has actually spoken, and Rehnquist still finds a way to reject its
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Similarly, in Central Machinery v Arizona State Tax Commis-
sion,' Rehnquist joined a dissent by Stewart arguing that state taxation
on the reservation is preempted only if federal legislation is so pervasive
m the area that the state's action would directly interfere." In White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker" Rehnquist joined in Stevens's dis-
sent arguing that state taxes on the sale of tribal timber were not preempt-
ed by federal laws regulating the harvest and sale of tribal timber resourc-
es.
174
Because tribes are sovereign entities that have entered into 'agree-
ments with the United States, preemption of state law is a logical way of
handling Indian cases. However, preemption cases often call for judicial
interpretation of congressional intent, which can be difficult to discern.
Cases can typically go either way "7 On tius subject, Rehnquist's view is
that courts cannot presume that a federal law is intended to preempt state
law unless Congress clearly expresses such an intent. Of course, this rea-
soning is opposite to that in Oliphant, in which Rehnquist found that
Congress's silence implied a great deal about its intent. Distressingly, the
only obvious consistency between these two lines of reasoning is that both
are hostile to Indian interests.
In the area of state taxes on reservations, Justice Rehnquist has devel-
oped a test that severely limits tribal immunity from state taxes. The
Rehnquist test is simply to ask whether Congress has spoken to the partic-
ular type of tax the state wishes to impose, and whether Congress intended
that Indian lands be immune.76 The intent of Congress in each case is
ascertained by determining whether there has been a traditional immunity
for Indians against imposition of this type of tax."7 If traditional immu-
nity exists, and Congress has spoken on the subject and has not removed
the immunity, the intent of Congress presumably is to retain the immunity
for the Indians.'7 If there is no finding of "traditional immunity," how-
ever, Congress's silence means no tribal immunity exists.'79 Congress
must specifically preempt state action in the area of the tax for the state's
intent.
171. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
172. Central Mack, 448 U.S. at 169 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
173. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
174. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 157-59.
175. But see McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174; supra notes 43 and 48-50 and accompanying text
(indicating that the issue should be decided in favor of the Indian interest where ambiguity exists).
176. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 178-79 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part, concumng in the result, and dissenting in part).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 179.
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taxing power to be limited. Rehnquist's test is contrary to the Indian law
doctrine disfavoring the application of state laws on a reservation where
Congress has expressed no clear intent.8
Justice Rehnquist spelled out this state tax immunity test in Washing-
ton v Confederated Tribes of Colville,' where he concurred in part and
dissented in part. Rehnquist agreed with the majority that a state tax could
be imposed on nonmember purchases of cigarettes and other goods on
reservation lands, including trust lands.' He disagreed with the
majority's holding that the state excise tax could not be imposed on
tribally owned vehicles, arguing that the particular tax scheme should be
examined to see how the tax was implemented. 3 If the tax were im-
posed only on vehicles that would be driven outside of reservation bound-
aries, it should be upheld, because the traditional tax immunity granted to
the Indians was for sales to Indians by Indians, for reservation use.8 4
Justice Rehnquist used his immunity test again m his dissent m
Ramah Navajo School Board v New Mexico Bureau of Revenue,85 ar-
guing that a school construction contractor should not be immune from
state taxes. The majority held that federal and tribal interests warranted an
exemption because the school construction project was federally funded,
and there was no legitimate state interest to justify imposition of the
tax.'86 Justice Rehnquist disagreed. He argued, as he had in Colville, that
a balancing of interests test was not appropriate because Congress has the
power of decision over tax immunity 187 Absent congressional intent and
preemption of the state's power to tax, Justice Rehnquist would uphold the
state tax unless it discriminated against Indians.
Rehnquist was able to write for a majority of the Court in upholding
state power to tax sales to nonmembers on reservation lands in Oklahoma
Tax Commission v Potawatomi Indian Tribe.' s While admitting the ex-
istence of Indian tribal sovereign immunity, Rehnquist reiterated that this
immunity never extended to on-reservation sales to nonmembers. 9 The
opinion in Potawatomi was supported by Rehnquist's earlier majority
opinion in Moe v Confederated Salish and Kootenat Tribes,"9 where the
180. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
181. 447 U.S. 134.
182. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 181.
183. Id. at 188-90.
184. See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 482 (1976).
185. 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
186. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 845-46.
187. Id. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
189. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. at 512.
190. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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Court held that it was not an undue burden to require an Indian reserva-
tion to collect the state sales tax, which was validly imposed on purchases
by nonmembers. 9'
Justice Rehnquist has consistently been on the side of the state's
power to tax. In a 1989 Stevens majority opimon in Cotton Petroleum v.
New Mexico,"9 Rehnquist joined in holding that a state can tax non-Indi-
an lessees for on-reservation production of oil and gas. 93 Rehnquist
joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in County of Yakima v. Confed-
erated Tribes,194 which held that the state could impose an ad valorem
tax (although not an excise tax) on allotted reservation land." He also
joined Scalia and the majority m Blatchford v. Native Village,'96 ruling
that a suit by Alaska villages challenging a state revenue-sharing statute
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment."9
While consistently arguing that states have the right to interfere in
tribal government, Rehnquist believes the states have no correlative re-
sponsibility to entertain Indian claims in state courts. He believes that state
courts are not required to exercise jurisdiction in cases filed by Indian
plaintiffs against non-Indian defendants. One example of this view, Fort
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, came before the Supreme
Court twice.'98 Both times the Court held that Public Law 280' does
not give North Dakota the right to disclaim jurisdiction over a suit brought
by a tribal member against a nonmember.' Both times Rehnquist dis-
sented, arguing that North Dakota did have a right to disclaim jurisdic-
tion."°l He argued that Public Law 280 authorizes states to exercise jurs-
diction over Indian claims, but does not require this result. North Dakota
chose to disclaim jurisdiction in suits brought by Indians unless the Indi-
ans consented to jurisdiction in claims brought against them, a fair quid
pro quo according to Rehnquist.' But Rehnquist's solution would not
be a quid pro quo, because Indian courts have no similar jurisdiction over
191. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483.
192. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
193. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186.
194. 112 S. CL 683 (1992).
195. County of Yakima, 112 S. CL at 694.
196. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
197. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782.
198. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) [hereinafter Wold 1]; Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) [hereinafter Wold II].
199. Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
200. Wold 1, 467 U.S. at 154; Wold 11, 476 U.S. at 887.
201. Wok) I, 467 U.S. at 159 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Wok) II, 476 U.S. at 897 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
202. Wold II, 476 U.S. at 896 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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non-Indians, and Indians are not asking for such jurisdiction when they
bring a claim in state court.
Rehnquist's opinions have chipped away at sovereignty in other areas
as well. He wrote the majority opinion in United States v Cherokee of
Oklahoma,2"' ruling that the federal government, under the navigation
servitude, need not compensate an Indian tribe for damage to a riverbed
owned in fee by the tribe. In another Rehnquist opinion, the Court ruled in
Nevada v United States2' that the significant passage of time defeated
Indian claims to water.
205
V CONCLUSION
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has had a significant impact on the
United States Supreme Court's attitude toward Indians. In the seventy-nine
Supreme Court opinions involving Indian claims in which Rehnquist has
taken part since his appointment to the Court m 1972, he has rarely cast a
vote in favor of Indian interests.2" Rehnquist's ideas about Indian law,
coupled with his position as Chief Justice, have had grave implications for
Indian sovereignty and welfare. The federal government has experimented
with termination before, with devastating results for Indian tribes.' De-
spite the lessons the government learned through its historical policy vacil-
lations, and despite its current commitment to tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, Rehnquist is advocating and implementing a judicial termi-
nation policy
Several underlying jurisprudential attitudes of Chief Justice Rehnquist
become apparent from the study of his opinions. First, when he can find
disestablishment or termination of an Indian tribe or treaty right through
federal legislation, even when the legislation is murky or ambiguous, he
203. 480 U.S. 700 (1987).
204. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
205. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 127-30, 143-44.
206. One possible exception is United States v. Mazurie, where the Court held that Congress had
delegated regulatory control over the on-reservation sale of liquor to the tribes. 419 U.S. 544, 546
(1975). The Court held that the tribes had "sufficient" inherent power to accept delegation of federal
authority. Id. at 557. But the Court declined to decide whether the tribes had inherent power to engage
in such regulation in the absence of federal delegation.
A more likely exception is California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, where Rehnquist
joined the majonty in holding that Public Law 280 conferred only criminal, and not regulatory, juns-
diction to the state of Califorma, and that the state could not regulate an on-reservation bingo enter-
prise. 480 U.S. 202, 212 (1987). See also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct.
1985 (1993); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo
Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Fisher v.
Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1974); McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1993).
207. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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will do so. Second, when he can find a means of limiting tribal court
jurisdiction, he will so hold. Third, he has created new tests for determin-
ing the limits of tribal court jurisdiction, based on the tribes' dependent
status and the "unspoken assumption" of Congress. These phrases are so
vague that they establish no principled standards. They give the Court
carte blanche to decide cases subjectively. Fourth, he believes that state
regulations and taxes should apply on reservations, especially to non-Indi-
ans, unless federal legislation can be found expressing an opposite intent.
Tis position reverses a long-standing rule of construction in Indian cas-
es-that state law does not apply on a reservation unless Congress clearly
expresses that intent. Finally, he attaches little importance to the long-
standing rules of construing treaties, agreements, and statutes in favor of
Indian interests.
Justice Rehnquist's stand against Indian claims has not changed since
the first opinion in which he participated in 1973. °" He is, at least, con-
sistent and predictable. The recent conservative majority on the Court has
enabled him to obtain support from a majority of his fellow justices. The
last dissent he joined in an Indian case was written by Stevens in
1989.m
Will the Rehnquist concepts continue to be implemented by the pres-
ent Court? As the makeup of the Court continues to change, Rehnquist's
words in the 1959 Harvard Law Record may prove telling indeed:
It is high time that those critical of the [Warren] Court recogmze
[t]hat for one hundred seventy-five years the constitution has been what
the judges say it is. If greater judicial self-restraint is desired, or a dif-
ferent interpretation [of the Bill of Rights], then men sympathetic to such
desires must sit upon the high court 0 '
One can only hope that Rehnquist loses his majority before his judi-
cial agenda completely devastates tribal sovereignty
208. Compare this trend to the change in Justice Douglas's opinions. See generally Ralph W.
Johnson, Justice Douglas and the Indian Cases, in HE SHALL Nor PASS Tins WAY AGAIN: THE LEG-
ACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 191-213 (Stephen L. Washy ed., 1990).
209. Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (dissenting from opinion
that state had no authority to enter adoption decree of Indian child domiciled on reservation).
210. William Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, HARV. L. REc., Oct. 8, 1959,
at 7, 10.
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